China's Environmental Authoritarianism

China is in the process of transforming from the worst environmental disaster in the world to a model that the may redefine development in the Global South

The red flag of China’s Communist Party, long emblematic of industrial expansion and headlong economic growth, now flies amid a new emphasis on environmental ambition. Beijing no longer frames its environmental policy simply in terms of protection but invokes the concept of an “ecological civilization” (生态文明, shengtai wenming), an expansive framework that seeks to integrate state-led planning with environmental sustainability. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this vision is evolving into a distinctive model of governance: a centrally managed, often authoritarian approach to environmental management, notable for its technological ambition and institutional scope.

China’s economic rise over recent decades was accompanied by severe environmental degradation. Urban air pollution, contaminated waterways, and ecological depletion reflected a developmental paradigm that prioritized growth over sustainability. The scenes of ecological destruction across the country were among the most apocalyptic witnessed in history, and often (rightly) the subject of extremely alarming reporting:

The calamity reached its peak just as Xi Jinping assumed China’s presidency in late 2012. In January 2013, for example, measurements by Beijing municipal government showed that highest recorded level of PM2.5 (particulate matter smaller than 2.5 micrometers in size), was at nearly 1,000 μg per cubic meter — more than 50 times safe levels. Along with corruption, the environmental crisis was considered the biggest challenge that the new Xi government would have to confront.

China’s ecological turn

And indeed, under Xi Jinping’s leadership environmental concerns have gained prominence in China’s national discourse, culminating in the environment being named as a constitutional priority. Though the term “ecological civilization” remains conceptually broad, it has become central to China’s policy agenda, signaling a shift toward embedding environmental objectives within the framework of national development.

Crucially, however, this shift does not imply a move toward liberal environmental governance or participatory democracy. Instead, it aligns with what scholars describe as “authoritarian environmentalism” (AE): a model in which the authority to enact and enforce environmental policy resides primarily with centralized, technocratic elites who operate with limited public accountability. AE entails the imposition of stringent policies that compel individuals and industries toward environmentally sustainable practices, frequently without public consultation. In China, this approach is not merely theoretical but increasingly operational, marked by a consolidation of state power and enhanced political-administrative oversight.

As Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro documented in China Goes Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Damaged Planet, the development of Chinese authoritarian environmentalism can be traced from a previously fragmented and symbolic framework to a more centralized and assertive system. In earlier periods, national environmental directives often lacked effective implementation at the local level. Local governments, prioritizing economic performance and often shielded by institutional ambiguities, frequently ignored or superficially complied with central mandates. This resulted in a persistent “implementation gap,” where environmental protection was subordinated to growth objectives, and self-reporting by local officials often lacked credibility. These conditions fostered a landscape in which local actors could pursue short-term economic gains with limited oversight.

The consolidation of power under Xi Jinping marked a turning point. The CCP identified environmental degradation as not only an economic concern but also a threat to social stability and regime legitimacy. The response was a greater degree of central control. A key instrument in this process has been the Central Environmental Inspection Teams (CEITs), which conduct targeted, high-profile inspections with broad enforcement authority. These inspections have curtailed local discretion and reinforced the primacy of central mandates. Local officials face significant penalties for non-compliance, reinforcing the seriousness of environmental targets. The 2018 establishment of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, which consolidated functions previously spread across multiple ministries, further institutionalized this centralized approach.

Yet China’s current model of environmental governance — what Chen Xiang and Alex Y. Lo have termed “AE 2.0” — is not exclusively coercive. It incorporates a broader repertoire of policy instruments, including market-based mechanisms. In recent years, the Chinese government has introduced environmental tax reforms, expanded the use of green finance, and developed a national carbon market. By the beginning of this decade China’s green bond market had become the second largest globally, issued $68.9B in sustainable debt in 2024. Its emissions trading system in the power sector has now surpassed the European Union’s in scale, and has expanded to include the steel, aluminum and cement industries. These initiatives aim to align market incentives with environmental goals, drawing private sector actors into the implementation process.

AE 2.0 also permits a limited degree of public engagement. While participation remains tightly controlled and often symbolic, the government has encouraged citizen reporting of environmental violations through official channels. This form of state-sanctioned participation allows the regime to harness societal oversight in ways that reinforce, rather than challenge, centralized authority. Scholars have described China’s approach as a “top-down incorporation” of liberal elements, whereby participatory and market-oriented practices are selectively integrated to enhance the efficacy of authoritarian governance.

Nonetheless, the social implications of this model are significant. The implementation of environmental policies, particularly through CEITs, can have severe economic consequences for resource-dependent communities. Sudden enforcement actions may result in industry closures and job losses, disproportionately affecting already vulnerable populations. These dynamics raise concerns about environmental justice, as the burdens of transition are not evenly distributed and are often borne by those least equipped to adapt. As Evelyn Li Wang has put it, China’s environmental policy has transitioned from a “tragedy of the commons” to a “tragedy of the ordinaries.”

The Post-Liberal Developmental Choice: Environmental Authoritarianism versus Petro-State Authoritarianism

Zooming out from the internal implications of all this for China itself, it’s also important to understand that China is advancing a distinctive model of environmental governance that may have important international implications. Specifically, its combination of centralized authority with strategic deployment of market instruments and constrained forms of public participation diverges sharply from the liberal-democratic paradigm, which tends to emphasize deliberative consensus-building, stakeholder engagement, and decentralized enforcement. China’s approach prioritizes state-led coordination, policy coherence, and implementation capacity. In doing so, it offers a template for technocratic environmentalism that is both disciplined and scalable — qualities particularly attractive to states where political leaders seek to maintain centralized control while addressing growing climate and ecological pressures.

As China continues to refine its “ecological civilization” framework, it is increasingly positioning this model as an exportable governance strategy for other developing countries. Beijing’s expanding capabilities in renewable energy manufacturing, smart grid infrastructure, surveillance technologies, and AI-driven resource management systems constitute a kind of turnkey solution for states in the Global South seeking to manage the green transition without embracing liberal reforms. Unlike Western environmental aid or development assistance, which in recent decades has been accompanied by governance conditionalities — such as democratic accountability, civil society engagement, or human rights oversight — China’s offer is technocratic and transactional: a ready-made set of tools and governance practices that enable ecological modernization while reinforcing elite authority and central control.

A critical component of China’s exportable model lies in its technological dominance over next-generation digital infrastructure, particularly 5G networks. Through state-backed firms such as Huawei and ZTE, China has established itself as a global leader in supplying the hardware and software for high-speed, high-capacity data transmission systems. These networks not only enable the efficient coordination of green technologies — such as smart grids, electric vehicle fleets, and precision agriculture — but also serve as the backbone for advanced systems of social surveillance and control. Integrated with facial recognition, biometric data collection, and AI-driven behavior monitoring, China’s 5G-enabled platforms can be used to track emissions compliance as easily as they monitor protest activity or enforce political loyalty. For authoritarian-leaning regimes in the Global South, this dual-use infrastructure offers the ability to modernize their economies while simultaneously enhancing state capacity for internal control. In this way, China’s offer goes beyond environmental or technological assistance; it includes the tools to build resilient, digitally empowered governance systems that reinforce elite dominance under the guise of ecological progress.

This model is likely to be especially attractive to oil-importing states across the Global South that are economically vulnerable to price volatility, foreign exchange constraints, and fossil fuel dependency. For these governments, China's approach offers a way to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons by rapidly deploying solar, wind, and electric vehicle infrastructure at scale, often financed through Chinese development banks and implemented by state-owned enterprises. Crucially, the political economy of this green transition is framed not as a democratic opening but as a form of energy sovereignty that strengthens the state’s ability to direct national development, suppress dissent, and manage political risk. In short, Beijing offers an appealing proposition: environmental and technological modernization without political liberalization.

This “authoritarian ecological toolkit” may come to define one pole in the emerging global contest over models of energy transition and environmental governance. On one side stands a nascent alliance of states pursuing what might be called an Illiberal Petro-State Axis, stretching from Riyadh to Moscow to Washington. This coalition, though diverse in ideology, is bound by a shared commitment to fossil fuel rentierism, autocratic political control, and the use of energy exports as instruments of geopolitical leverage. Its model is extractive, carbon-intensive, and premised on extending the life of hydrocarbon dominance through new infrastructure, supply chains, and techno-fixes like carbon capture.

In contrast, China’s approach may appeal to a different set of developmental regimes — particularly those that lack substantial fossil fuel resources but wish to maintain regime durability while navigating the green transition. Where the Illiberal Petro-State Axis seeks to entrench fossil capital as a foundation of political power, China offers an alternative: to harness green industrial policy, data-intensive governance, and infrastructural modernization as means of sustaining authoritarian rule under ecological constraints. The result could be a bifurcated global order in which states align not only around resource endowments or geopolitical alliances, but around distinct models of political-environmental governance. In this context, China’s “AE 2.0” may function not merely as a domestic strategy, but as a globally influential paradigm that is capable of reshaping how states in the Global South imagine the relationship between ecological security, economic development, and political control.