What Sort of Regime Is Beijing, Really?

Zombie political theory continues to distort how Westerns (Americans especially) see the government in China

China’s economic and political evolution often strikes Western observers as a bundle of paradoxes: on the one hand, it’s the site of the world’s most cut-throat capitalism, orchestrated by, of all things, the world’s most effective Communist Party; on the other hand, it’s one of the primary sites for the elaboration of neoliberalism, but in the most deeply illiberal form imaginable. Since the vast majority of Americans, even in the political class, have spent little or no time in China, there is also a strong tendency for China to serve as a kind of political Rorschach Test of commentators’ political priors, hopes, and fears. On the contrary, however, what seem like paradoxes from a Western vantage point represent, for Beijing, a coherent and deeply pragmatic approach, rooted in a distinct historical consciousness and an unyielding commitment to national strength and Party legitimacy. This approach is also informed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s historical understanding of “Chineseness” as a cultural identity — not as a racial or ethnic matter, but as a “civilizational” project centered on a relational worldview that emphasizes flexibility, empiricism, and pragmatism, in which all things are interconnected.

China’s apparent contradictions largely dissolve when one steps outside the confines of North Atlantic political theory, which for most of the last 75 years years has tending to assume that “development,” properly speaking, was along a linear path towards liberal democracy and free-market capitalism. The “end of history” as Francis Fukuyama famously observed, at the end of the Cold War, meant that the goal of everyone everywhere was now allegedly about “getting to Denmark.” But the simplest way to begin to understand China better, including what its probable developmental trajectory looks like, is to get away from the idea that everyone in the world holds these same goals. (Indeed, with Trump now again in power in the United States, it may finally be time for political theorists to let modernization theory die.)

The State as Super-Capitalist

The notion of “anti-capitalist capitalism” seems like the definition of a contradiction in terms, particularly for those steeped in the Milton Friedman’s ideas about political economy. In fact, post-Mao China’s economic model doesn’t aim to dismantle capitalism; it seeks to harness it under stringent state control. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) effectively operates as a kind of super-capitalist, directing vast capital resources, fostering strategic industries, and even incubating private enterprises, all while maintaining decisive power over the commanding heights of the economy. From the CCP’s perspective, the object of national economic policy is not to create opportunities for capitalists to get rich, it is to harness the capitalists’ venal ambitions within incentive structures that direct those ambitions towards actions that enhance the long-term well-being of Chinese society as a whole.

This “government-oriented” (官本 位) way of thinking has deep historical roots, shaped by early bureaucratization from the Qin Dynasty onwards, which has generally prioritized stable rule and domestic affairs and eschewed efforts to conquer or convert “the barbarians” abroad who the Chinese mostly see as basically unreformable. In terms of foreign relations, a central lodestar of Chinese international relations thoery is the concept of “all-under-heaven” (tianxia, 天下) which represents the world stage not as an “international anarchy” but rather as inclusive global system focused on universal peace and harmony.

This orientation is deeply embedded in the political culture of China: though the common people are often disappointed by officials who fail at their jobs, there is a profound belief that the government will solve its problems. State-owned enterprises (SOEs), often massive conglomerates, remain central to this architecture, acting not merely as commercial entities but as instruments of national policy. Even the most successful private firms, from tech giants to manufacturing powerhouses, operate within a framework where their growth is facilitated, but also ultimately constrained by and subordinated to Party directives and oversight. This is not the invisible hand of the market; it’s a visible, often firm, hand guiding capital to serve strategic national objectives. The goal isn’t the unfettered pursuit of profit for its own sake, but rather the deployment of market mechanisms to achieve rapid economic growth and enhance China’s global standing, all without ceding the CCP’s political supremacy.

Neoliberal Tools, Authoritarian Ends

Similarly, China’s “illiberal neoliberalism” appears paradoxical only if one assumes neoliberalism’s inherent link to individual liberties and limited government, as often posited in college courses on the subject. Beijing has indeed embraced certain tools and policies associated with neoliberalism: opening to foreign investment, integrating deeply into global supply chains, fostering intense domestic competition, and promoting a highly efficient, export-oriented economy. What’s more, these measures have been undeniably successful, spurring the greatest bout of economic growth in human history, and lifting a billion people out of poverty. (One of the great embarrassments for the “development industry” is that eight decades into the project of postcolonial global economic development, the CCP that has led more people out of poverty in the last four decades than all the World Bank and western foreign aid has in the last eight.)

At the same time, these economic reforms have occurred within a political system that remains resolutely authoritarian. While in the 1990s there were many in the West who thought that as China got wealthier, it would “inevitably” liberalize, in fact there has been no corresponding embrace of political pluralism, independent media, or robust civil liberties. Instead, the Party meticulously controls information, maintains pervasive surveillance, and systematically suppresses dissent. Economic efficiency and global integration are not pursued to empower individuals or foster democratic institutions. Rather, they are instrumentalized to strengthen the state, to enhance the Party’s legitimacy through continuous material improvement, and to project national power. In sum, China expresses its own “inverted” form of neoliberalism, where the pursuit of market-driven prosperity serves to reinforce, rather than erode, state control. And that this would be the CCP’s strategy should not have surprised anyone in the West who wasn’t blinded by their own zombie philosophy that all of history tends inexorably toward liberalism.

A Coherent Chinese Logic

From Beijing’s perspective, in other words, “illiberal neoliberalism” and “anti-capitalist capitalism” are not paradoxes but components of a coherent strategy for national rejuvenation. The historical trauma of the “century of humiliation” instilled a deep-seated desire for state strength and sovereignty. The chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution reinforced the Party’s conviction that stability, maintained through firm control, is paramount for development. Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” (改革开放) program, which began in 1978, aimed to produced what Deng in 1982 would call “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义). What Deng realized was that market forces were necessary to unleash the productivity needed in order for the Party retain ultimate ideological and political authority. Perestroika without glasnost, while escaping “shock therapy.”

This blend is what has allowed China to leverage the dynamism of market economics while mitigating what the CCP perceives as the socially and politically destabilizing influences of Western-style liberalism. It enables the Chinese state to direct resources towards long-term strategic goals (such as technological self-sufficiency, green energy transition, and military modernization) unburdened by the demands of electoral cycles or independent judicial review. The Chinese social contract is not predicated on individual rights and democratic participation, but on the delivery of sustained prosperity and national pride under the Party’s stewardship. This contrasts with traditional Western views that often assume a linear path to liberal democracy and free-market capitalism.

Ultimately, the “paradoxes” of contemporary China merely highlight the limitations of applying universalist Western theoretical frameworks to a unique developmental trajectory. China operates on its own terms, forging a path that is neither purely capitalist nor conventionally socialist, neither liberal nor entirely totalitarian. It’s the CCP’s adaptive capacity and its single-minded focus on power and progress that is allowing it to shape a future that will doubtless continue to defy the categories of Western political theory. In the end, the goal of the regime is ensure the economic and political autonomy of the country such that “Chineseness” can never again be compromised by Western norms.