The Green Apocalypse and the Twilight of Weber
Notes Towards a Political Sociology of the Planetary Crisis
The contemporary moment, fraught as it is with the gathering storm clouds of planetary unraveling, presents a profound challenge not only to the biophysical foundations of human civilization, but also to the very categories through which we apprehend political order. We stand, it seems, at a civilizational inflection point, a juncture where the long-assumed stabilities of modernity — the nation-state, the rule of law, the faith in science, the promise of progress — are increasingly revealed as contingent, fragile, and ultimately, unsustainable. I’ve been thinking about this a lot as I’ve been recently rereading Max Weber. Weber’s conceptual arsenal — his sociology of domination, his anatomy of political communities, his typologies of authority, and his rigorous delineation of social orders — still seems to me useful for dissecting the crisis of legitimacy that haunts our destabilizing world, but also needs to be rethought for an age of planetary crises.
This post attempts to deploy Weberian ideal-typical analysis not merely as a post-hoc diagnostic tool, but as a predictive instrument, a means of anticipating the protean forms of political decay that may emerge as planetary crisis intensifies. Leaving aside the fraying concepts of the national and the state, Weber’s concepts of legitimacy, physical violence, and territorial control remain the sinews of the modern political order. Can they still retain their analytical purchase in a world where the ground beneath our feet, quite literally, is shifting?
I. The Melting Iron Cage: Weber and the Anthropocene Predicament
Weber, publishing mostly in the first two decades of the 20th centuries, grappled with the “disenchantment” of the world, the inexorable “rationalization” of social life, and the rise of “bureaucratic domination.” Indeed these terms, now sociological cliches, all come from Weber. He famously lamented the “iron cage” of modernity, a system of instrumental rationality that, while delivering unprecedented material progress, simultaneously stifled individual freedom and moral meaning. Yet, even Weber, with his acute sense of historical tragedy, could scarcely have imagined the sheer scale of the planetary predicament that now confronts us. The Anthropocene, that epoch in which human activity has become the dominant geological force, threatens to unleash a cascade of systemic disruptions — climate change, resource depletion, mass extinction — that dwarf any of the crises that Weber analyzed.
The polycrisis, as it is now known, is a crisis of limits. It is a stark reminder that the modern project of limitless growth and expansion is fundamentally incompatible with the finite resources and delicate equilibria of the biosphere. As these limits are breached, the very foundations of social order are crumbling, with one crisis cascading into another. Scarcity is breeding conflict, environmental degradation is displacing populations, and the capacity of states to provide for their citizens is eroding. In such a world, the Weberian categories of legitimacy, violence, and territory — the three pillars of political domination — are subjected to immense strain.
II. The Erosion of Legitimacy: From Rational-Legal to... What?
For Weber, legitimacy is the sine qua non of stable political order. He famously identified three ideal types of legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. Modernity, he argued, is characterized by the ascendancy of rational-legal authority, a system of rule based on impersonal laws, bureaucratic procedures, and the consent of the governed. Yet, the planetary crisis is undermining this rational-legal order in profound ways.
The promise of the modern rational-legal state — a promise of predictable, efficient, and equitable governance — rested on a foundation of ever-expanding material abundance and consequent social stability. As the polycrisis intensifies, however, this promise is becoming increasingly difficult for states to meet. Overwhelmed by the scale of the challenges they face, states are resorting to increasingly coercive measures to ensure compliance, eroding (if not openly rejecting) the very principles of due process and individual rights that underpin the liberal form of rational-legal authority. Moreover, the growing awareness of the systemic nature of the planetary crisis, and the manifest inability of existing political institutions to address it effectively, is producing a profound crisis of confidence in the system itself. Why obey laws, after all, when the lawgivers seem incapable of preventing the collapse of the world?
In such a context, we are witnessing a resurgence of more primordial forms of legitimacy. Charismatic leaders, promising salvation from the impending apocalypse, are gaining traction, particularly in societies where traditional forms of authority remain strong. Apocalyptic narratives, whether religious or secular, provide a sense of meaning and purpose in a world that seems to be spiraling out of control. Yet, such charismatic authority, as Weber himself recognized, is inherently unstable, prone to the vagaries of individual personality and the dangers of demagoguery.
We are also witnessing various perverse mutations of traditional authority, as communities fragment along ethnic and religious lines, seeking refuge in the certainties of a mythic past. In a world of scarcity and uncertainty, the “forever form” of tribal bonds are becoming increasingly salient, even as they exacerbate conflict with other groups. The dream of a universal, cosmopolitan order, so central to the liberal imagination, is giving way to a Hobbesian war of all against all, a descent into a new dark age.
III. The Privatization of Violence: From State Monopoly to Warlordism?
Weber famously defined the state as the entity that possesses the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. This monopoly, he argued, is essential for the maintenance of social order. Yet, the planetary crisis threatens to erode this monopoly in several ways.
As state capacity weakens, and as resources become increasingly scarce, the control of violence is slipping from the hands of the central government. Private militias, criminal gangs, and warlords are ascendent, vying for control of territory and resources. In much of the world state, rather than being the sole guarantor of security, is just one violent actor among many, competing in a brutal free-for-all. This “privatization” of violence, as it were, represents a fundamental challenge to the Weberian ideal-type of the modern state.
Moreover, the very nature of violence may change in an era of planetary crisis. Conflicts are increasingly driven by competition for resources — water, arable land, energy, etc. — rather than by traditional geopolitical rivalries. New technologies of warfare, from cyberattacks to autonomous weapons systems, are further destabilizing the existing order, making it even more difficult for states to maintain control. The specter of environmental refugees, displaced by climate change and planetary degradation, also poses a unique challenge to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, potentially leading to new forms of conflict and instability.
IV. The Deterritorialization of Power: From the Westphalian System to... What Comes Next?
The modern state system, born of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, is fundamentally territorial. State sovereignty is defined by control over a fixed geographical space. Yet, the planetary crisis is undermining this territorial basis of political power in several ways.
Climate change, for example, is a quintessentially deterritorialized phenomenon. Greenhouse gas emissions in one part of the world can have devastating consequences in another, far-distant region. This creates a fundamental mismatch between the global nature of the problem and the territorial nature of the state. As states struggle to cope with the effects of climate change, their ability to control their own territory, and to protect their citizens, may be severely compromised.
Moreover, the rise of transnational corporations, global financial flows, and the internet have already begun to erode the traditional boundaries of the nation-state. In an era of planetary crisis, these trends are accelerating, as resources become increasingly scarce and as populations are forced to migrate across borders in search of survival. The very concept of “territory” is becoming increasingly fluid and contested, giving rise to new forms of political organization that transcend the traditional nation-state model. We may well see the rise of powerful city-states, transnational governance structures, or even entirely novel forms of “deterritorialized” technomadic political communities that are difficult to categorize within Weber’s framework.
V. The Future Haunts the Present: Towards a New Political Imaginary
As the iron cage melts in the blast furnace of the Anthropocene, it is up to us to forge something new. Weber’s work, for all its brilliance, remains rooted in the historical specificities of the modern era, rooted in masses of population united within national boundaries and divided along class lines. His categories, while powerful tools for analyzing the rise of the nation-state and the dynamics of industrial capitalism, are insufficient for fully grasping the protean forms of political order that are emerging in the wake of the planetary unraveling. We are thus compelled to move beyond Weber, not by rejecting his insights, but by extending and adapting them.
What, then, might a post-Weberian political imaginary look like? It is perhaps too early to say with any certainty, but let me propose a few tentative thoughts. We may be moving towards a world in which:
Legitimacy is increasingly decoupled from the nation-state, and becomes more closely tied to the ability of whatever institutions provide for basic human needs in a context of scarcity and uncertainty.
Violence is increasingly privatized and deterritorialized, with new technologies of warfare and new forms of conflict emerging that challenge the state’s monopoly of force.
Territory itself becomes more fluid and contested, with new forms of political organization emerging that transcend the traditional boundaries of the nation-state.
In such a world, the traditional Weberian categories of state, sovereignty, and power need to be radically rethought. We need to develop new concepts, new analytical frameworks, and ultimately, a new political imaginary, to navigate the turbulent waters that lie ahead.
One person I’ve found particularly intriguing to think with is my friend Venkatesh Rao, whose work on what he calls protocols offers a compelling, if partial, glimpse into this emerging post-Weberian landscape. His concept of the “cozyweb,” coined before the pandemic speaks to the fragmentation of online space into a multiplicity of insular, self-regulating communities, each with its own distinct norms and modes of governance. This mirrors, in a digital register, the broader trend towards the deterritorialization of power, as individuals and groups increasingly find their primary affiliations and loyalties outside the boundaries of the nation-state. Rao’s analysis suggests a future in which legitimacy is less a function of centralized authority and more a product of localized, networked interactions, a vision that resonates with the growing importance of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and other forms of distributed governance. It is a vision of governance as a minimal viable product that one opts into, rather than as a standardized product produced at maximal scale. But Rao also acknowledged the limits of this vision — that what he is describing, while hopeful, is no utopian. The world of online interactions is also beset by a pervasive sense of paranoia, distrust and constant squabbling, which will only get worse as AI’s simulational capacities are expanded and broadly adopted. This will inevitably facilitate new forms of conflict, albeit not along the lines that Weber described. Cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns, and the weaponization of social media are all examples of the ways in which violence is becoming increasingly deterritorialized and denationalized, challenging the traditional Weberian notion of the state’s monopoly of force.
Yes I think the protocol conversation (which we've been having in many different ways in literary studies for a while, but mostly at the margins) is the most important conversation going forward. I am a scholar of sonnets, for example. A sonnet is a protocol.
It is all too easy for those of us who live in the'modern' West to radically overestimate the degree to which the rational legal ideal has prevailed globally. The overwhelming majority of the world population have never lived in such a state and do not today.
However, for those of us that do, we are indeed facing a crisis of legitimacy. Why is this? Is it really the result of objective immiseration? Do the numbers confirm this? I'm not going to argue the point here, but I don't think so. This observation is I suspect true globally (see Rosling)
Modern rational legal states are indeed facing huge complex problems but the complexity of modern economies is such that any social order with any form of legitimacy would have such problems. Would a traditional or charismatic form of authority fare better? And can ANY form of authority fare better if society has lost faith in the value of expertise? IMHO the current assault on expertise is profoundly corrosive of legitimacy of rational legal legitimacy and Trump's charismatic leadership will likely fail to safely street the ship of state.
IMHO the deepest underlying cause of the crisis currently plaguing rational legal states is a groundswell of revolt against rationality itself. But the analysis of this is for another time.