At the Dawn of an Eco-Ideological Cold War

In which I talk to L'Express about the emergent new global divide

In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War receded into history, the political theorist Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history.” Liberal democracy and free-market capitalism, he suggested, had triumphed as the only credible model for political and economic organization. Globalization, neoliberalism, and the spread of democracy appeared to mark a new era. While some countries, like China, resisted political liberalization, even they integrated into the liberal global economy, joining institutions like the World Trade Organization. The 20th-century ideological battle between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes seemed to have been settled.

That moment, I argue in a new interview for the French magazine L’Express, is now over. The “end of history” era has given way to a new period marked not by ideological competition over political systems, but by conflict over how nations will respond to planetary crises. The global financial crisis of 2008 shattered faith in the neoliberal premise that globalization and free trade would reliably lift all boats. The return of Donald Trump to the White House, with his embrace of protectionism, transactional politics, and disdain for alliances, has delivered the coup de grâce. The assumption that liberal democracies, armed with free markets, would steadily expand prosperity and stability has collapsed.

We are now in an era of trade wars, protectionist measures, and transactional politics unseen since the 1930s. Trump has not confined his tariffs to traditional rivals or adversaries like Russia, China, or Iran; he has targeted close allies in Europe and Asia as well. Meanwhile, many countries are turning toward China, which has executed a disciplined industrial strategy and risen as a global manufacturing powerhouse. As a result, the old architecture of globalization — anchored in free trade, U.S.-led alliances, and neoliberal assumptions — is disintegrating.

The new geopolitical division, I suggest, will not map onto the old democracy–autocracy binary. Instead, they will form around how nations confront the ecological consequences of fossil-fuel-based industrialization. This is the fault line of what I have called the coming “eco-ideological Cold War.”

A Green Entente vs. an Axis of Ecological Evil

The central dividing line of the emerging global order will be between countries that embrace the green transition and those that insist on doubling down on the ancien metabolic regime. On one side are states that are net importers of fossil fuels, highly incentivized to develop renewable energy and achieve energy independence. China leads this group, having invested massively in solar, wind, and electric vehicles; Europe, too, has embraced green ideology and policy, making it a natural partner. These actors see decarbonization as both an economic opportunity and a survival necessity.

On the other side are the unapologetic petro-states: Russia, Saudi Arabia, and — under Trump — the United States. What unites these countries is not ideology but a shared existential fear that decarbonization threatens their national wealth and sovereignty. For Russia and Saudi Arabia, fossil fuels are the backbone of their economies. For Trump, leading the world’s greatest hydrocarbon producer, delaying the transition is a matter of U.S. national interest. Together, this bloc may resist the green transition not only through diplomacy but through more aggressive measures: cyberattacks on green infrastructure, climate dis/misinformation campaigns, and manipulation of energy markets.

At first glance, the idea of Europe aligning with China seems implausible. The two have very different political systems and profound disagreements on human rights. Yet, as I note in the interview, Beijing has little interest in interfering in the internal affairs of others, just as it resists foreign interference in its own. Europe, increasingly pressured and manipulated by the United States, may come to see China as a more pragmatic partner. One French diplomat this winter even suggested to me that, given a choice between building the “Europe Stack” on a Chinese-anchored technical base versus one dominated by figures like Musk, Thiel, and J.D. Vance, Europe might well choose China, which at least would not meddle in Europe’s internal politics, for example by providing political aid and comfort to German Far Right figures.

Economic logic also favors such an alignment. China dominates the production of green technologies: 80 percent of the world’s solar panels and more than 70 percent of its lithium-ion batteries come from Chinese factories. Europe offers a massive market for these goods. Together, China and Europe could drive the global green transition. As climate disasters intensify, I would argue, the ideological divide between democracies and autocracies will fade in significance compared to the imperative of survival.

Critics often dismiss China’s green leadership as greenwashing, pointing to its continued investment in coal and nuclear power. I acknowledge this duality but stresses the scale of China’s commitment to renewables. It has pursued a “comprehensive strategy”: dominating solar, wind, and electric vehicles while continuing fossil investments to ensure growth in the near term. Yet the direction of travel is clear: the Chinese energy mix is tilting steadily toward renewables. Whatever its flaws, Beijing’s green industrial policy has done more to drive down the costs of renewable technologies than all the international climate conferences combined.

What about the U.S. after Trump? Could the country swing back toward climate leadership? I am doubtful, at least in any near term. America is the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, and its most powerful corporations are fossil giants. Even if parts of the economy, like Silicon Valley, are demanding vastly more electricity for AI and other industries, that demand may prove temporary. Meanwhile, the U.S. political system is unlikely to abandon hydrocarbons, regardless of who occupies the White House. Trump’s rhetoric — about conquering Canada or seizing foreign oil — may be extreme, but the underlying strategy of securing fossil fuel supplies has been a constant of U.S. policy since the Carter Doctrine in the 1970s. From this perspective, America’s alignment with the petro-bloc seems durable.

Fault Lines Within the Blocs

At the same time, I caution in the interview against assuming uniformity within these blocs. History suggests alliances fracture. During the original Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split and De Gaulle’s withdrawal of French nuclear forces from the NATO chain of command in 1966 underscored how internal divisions beset both sides of the conflict. The ecological Cold War will be no different. The Chinese and the Europeans will never see totally eye to eye. Rivalries between Russia and the U.S. will persist despite their shared fossil interests. Iran, currently marginalized, could realign in unpredictable ways if its regime changes. Each bloc will contain fault lines, and managing them will be part of the geopolitical drama.

The alignment of the Global South will be decisive. China has been actively courting developing nations for 15–20 years, offering not only investment but green technologies — solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and 5G networks. Crucially, Beijing offers these without pressuring partners on human rights. This non-interference policy, combined with China’s technological leadership, makes its pitch highly attractive. The petro-bloc will also offer incentives, but China’s capacity to deliver tangible, affordable technologies gives it a powerful edge. And as a recent report from the Net-Zero Industrial Policy Lab shows, China in just the last coupel of years has made enormous green-related FDI investments across the world but especially in the Global South.

Where does this leave multilateral climate diplomacy? I am skeptical, for reasons Jonathan Blake and I spelled out recently in Aeon and at length in our book from last year. Institutions like the COP or the UN have convened countless conferences with little effect. What decarbonization we are seeing has come more from China’s investments and the resulting fall in renewable costs, not from international agreements. For multilateralism to matter, it would need to shift from setting abstract targets to enabling concrete action: technology-sharing, financing rapid deployment of renewables, and scaling solutions. Without that, such forums risk irrelevance.

A Post-Liberal Order

The geopolitical order that dominated the late 20th century is gone. We are moving into a post-liberal world, where the central dividing line is no longer democracy versus autocracy, but green transition versus petro-resistance. The coming decades may be defined by an eco-ideological Cold War between blocs led by China and Europe on one side, and Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. on the other. The Global South will be the swing factor, courted by both sides, with China at present offering the more compelling package of technologies and political non-interference. I expect multilateral institutions to play, at best, a supporting role.

This is a world where legitimacy will be judged less by adherence to political ideology and more by capacity to sustain life on a damaged planet. The stakes could not be higher: the fight for human health, ecological survival, and geopolitical stability are now one and the same.